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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc. v. Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm'n, 388 F.3d 903 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
LAW: In order to compel rulemaking under most circumstances,
there must be a demonstration that the agency's action was arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
FACTS: Under the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986,
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is required to
assess and collect annual fees, which are to be calculated "on the
basis of methods that the Commission determines, by rule, to be fair
and equitable." Originally, charges were based on the amount of
electricity transmitted and sales. However, in 2000, FERC
implemented changes that would better reflect the "unbundling" of
transmission and generation services that occurred during the 1990s.
FERC proposed that costs be solely based on the amount of
electricity transmitted; this policy was adopted in Order 641 after a
notice and comment period.
However, in June 2000, crisis hit the electricity industry, as
electricity prices skyrocketed in western states, particularly
California. California state laws regulating energy prices forced
utilities to suffer serious losses. As a result, FERC adopted a
"Strategic Plan," which placed greater emphasis on market oversight.
However, FERC denied requests for a rehearing on Order 641, which
remained in place. Three transmission providers filed a petition
asking FERC to reconsider its order. After these actions proved
unsuccessful, they petitioned the court to review FERC's policy.
ANALYSIS: The court first analyzed the issue of jurisdiction; given
the breadth of FERC's rulemaking power, the existence of a statute
involving implementation by other authorities, and the presumption
that Congress would place initial APA review in courts of appeals, it
concluded that there was jurisdiction.
Articulating the standard of review, the court emphasized that it
could only reverse FERC's actions if they were arbitrary, capricious,
or an abuse or discretion. Deference was particularly warranted
because the agency's determination was an exercise of rulemaking
power; moreover, the interests in question were economic, whereas
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cases reversing an agency's rulemaking decisions usually involve
threats to health or safety.
In analyzing the agency actions, the court rejected the
transmission providers' argument that FERC's change in focus
undermined the basis of Order 641. FERC did not dramatically
change its policy; rather, its reaction to the California crisis was an
anomaly rather than a permanent shift, and transmission remained a
priority with the agency. Moreover, in adopting Order 641, FERC
was not exclusively concerned with transmission, but was simply
placing greater emphasis on opening access to transmission systems
in light of recent changes. Furthermore, FERC was able to explain its
denial by stressing the need to focus on transmission in its reform of
the western energy markets. Given the deferential standard of review,
the court determined that FERC had provided satisfactory
justification, and also concluded that it would be inappropriate to
override FERC's order and interfere with the agency's attempts at
reform.
HOLDING: Review of the FERC orders is denied.
IMPACT: The court retains its deference towards the quasilegislative actions of agencies, and the transmission providers cannot
judicially compel FERC to reconsider its policy.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD CIRCUIT

Leia v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 427 (3d Cir. 2005).
LAW: The decision by an immigration judge who refused to give
any consideration to unauthenticated documents was not supported
by substantial evidence.
FACTS: Leia, a Ukranian of Polish descent, claimed asylum after
being beaten as a result of his involvement in the United National
Front (UNF). In November 1995, the Immigration Judge (U) held
that, based on her determinations of credibility, he was not eligible.
Her holding was based largely on Leia's inability to obtain
authenticated documents; she interpreted an agency regulation as
forbidding the admission of these documents, and refused to consider
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unauthenticated records as evidence in any capacity. In addition, the
U cited inconsistencies with regard to the date of one of the beatings
and inconsistent statements regarding the legal status of the UNF.
Finally, the judge considered a Department of State advisory opinion
and 1994 human rights report, which indicated that there were areas
in the Ukraine where Leia could live free of persecution.
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) gave Leia another
opportunity to authenticate his evidence. Leia attempted to overcome
the inconsistency in the date of his beating by submitting a hospital
record. Additionally, he brought forth an expert on Ukranian politics,
who explained why it would be impracticable for Leia to authenticate
documents. The U upheld the prior decision, stating that the expert's
testimony was irrelevant as he was not an expert on authentication,
and that Leia had failed to provide admissible authenticated
documents. The BIA affirmed the U's decision, concluding that Leia
had failed to offer sufficient evidence that he had a reasonable fear of
persecution.
The court determined that the U's holding was
ANALYSIS:
under
the substantial evidence standard, as a mistaken
inadequate
legal determination regarding the admissibility of documents
undermined the agency's ability to correctly weigh the facts.
Following recent precedent, the court held that the relevant agency
rule did not absolutely exclude unauthenticated records, as asylum
applicants may often be unable to get an authenticated document
from a hostile government, and should be given the opportunity to
authenticate evidence in other ways. Additionally, the court held that
the decision to disregard the testimony of Leia's expert, as his
expertise on Ukranian politics was relevant to the issue of whether
Leia could have his records certified. The medical records, which
could explain one of the inconsistencies in Leia's testimony, should
have been considered as evidence. Moreover, the court found that
Leia's testimony regarding the legality of the UNF was not entirely
contradictory; given the expert testimony, the inconsistencies might
be attributed to the organization's unfair treatment by the Ukranian
government, and the U did not sufficiently explain her conclusion.
Finally, the U's reliance on the Department of State profile and the
1994 human rights report was unwarranted, as the information was
too general and out-of-date to provide substantial evidence for the
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conclusion that Leia could successfully and reasonably locate to
another region in the Ukraine.
HOLDING: Leia's petition is granted, and his case is remanded.
IMPACT: Leia and other asylum applicants may present documents
as relevant evidence to demonstrate their fears of persecution without
getting these documents authenticated by a potentially hostile
government.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, NINTH CIRCUIT

High Sierra Hikers Ass'n v. Blackwell, 390 F.3d 630 (9th Cir.
2005).
LAW: The Forest Service's issuance and renewal of special-use
permits without a detailed analysis of possible cumulative impacts
violated the National Environmental Policy Act's requirement that
agencies take a "hard look" at the environmental consequences of
their actions. Under the Wilderness Act, the Forest Service must
determine both the necessity of commercial enterprise and the extent
to which the enterprise is needed. The Forest Service is not entitled to
Chevron deference when it gives out permits, and must consider its
obligations, under the Wilderness Act, to preserve wilderness areas.
FACTS: Beginning in 1997, the Forest Service attempted to alter its
existing Management Plan for the Ansel Adams and John Muir
Wilderness Areas by granting special-use permits to commercial
packstock operators and renewing earlier permits. High Sierra, a
nonprofit organization, intervened and sought injunctive relief,
claiming that the Forest Service's action§ violated the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Wilderness Act, the National
Forest Management Act (NFMA), and the Administrative Procedures
Act (APA). The Forest Service adopted a plan immediately prior to
the court's resolution, issuing a final Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS), a Record of Decision, and a Wilderness
Management Plan.
In its opinion, the lower court determined that the Forest Service
complied with the NFMA and the Wilderness Act. The plan had

Spring 2005

Legal Summaries

concluded that stock services were necessary after conducting an
investigation, in compliance with the NFMA. Likewise, the court
held that the Forest Service did not abuse its broad discretion under
the Wilderness Act to determine acceptable amounts of commercial
use. However, the court concluded that the Forest Service's actions
violated NEPA, and thus granted the injunction and ordered the
Forest Service to conduct a NEPA analysis of the cumulative impact
of commercial packstock operations. Both High Sierra and the Forest
Service appealed this decision.
ANALYSIS: High Sierra challenged the issuance of special-use
permits. The Court determined that these were final agency actions
with immediate consequences; thus, there was standing under Lujan.
The court found that the Forest Service had clearly violated
NEPA's mandate that federal agencies take the necessary "hard look"
at the potential environmental consequences of any given action. In
its issuance of multi-year special use permits, the Forest Service
failed to compile an EIS which considered the cumulative impact of
issuing multiple permits. Moreover, the agency's attempt to classify
its renewals as "categorical exclusions" which did not need to
comply with NEPA requirements failed, as this stance contradicted
the Forest Service's own regulations. The lower court's injunction
was upheld; the court is given broad discretion to fashion a remedy,
and the court properly balanced the risk of irreparable harm against
the impact on the operations of the Forest Service.
In addition, the court found that the Forest Service did not
comply with its obligations under the Wilderness Act. Under the Act,
the agency is given the responsibility of preserving the "wilderness
character" of an area; although commercial ventures are largely
prohibited, commercial services are allowed to the extent they are
necessary to realize the recreational and other purposes of the
wilderness. Although the court deferred to the Forest Service's
finding that packstock operations were "necessary," it also found that
the agency failed to determine the extent to which these services
were necessary. Finally, because the Forest Service was not acting
with the "force of law" when issuing permits, the court declined to
give Chevron deference to the agency's policy; thus, its interpretation
of the relative importance of conservation and recreation in the
Wilderness Act was only given "respect." The court ultimately
concluded that the Forest Service's responsibility to preserve the
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areas' wilderness character for future generations was not adequately
considered, and that the agency was therefore acting outside its area
of statutory discretion.
HOLDING: The District Court's injunction is upheld, and the case
is remanded for a determination of appropriate relief for Wilderness
Act violations.
IMPACT: The Forest Service must conduct a NEPA analysis of
cumulative impacts and a site-specific analysis for each permittee,
plus it must reduce the number of special-use permits. Chevron
deference is not available for the Forest Service's determinations of
its Wilderness Act responsibilities, and it may be separately liable for
overemphasizing the recreational uses of the wilderness at the
expense of conservation.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Doe v. Rumsfeld, 341 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2004).
LAW: Agencies must adhere to the procedures set forth in their own
regulations, even if they would not be required otherwise. Rules
concerning the use of anthrax vaccines to combat inhalation anthrax
were not a "logical outgrowth" of the original rulemaking process,
which concerned cutaneous anthrax.
FACTS: Since 1972, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has
been responsible for creating regulations which ensure the safety and
effectiveness of biological products. It first considered the efficacy of
anthrax vaccine absorbed (AVA) in 1973; an Advisory Panel
recommended it as protection against cutaneous anthrax for the atrisk population of individuals who could become infected with the
bacteria, particularly those who handled imported animal hides,
bones, and hair. In 1985, the FDA proffered a Proposed Rule, which
would reclassify bacterial vaccines. The agency proposed classifying
AVA as a Category I substance, concluding that the risks were
satisfactory for the limited group in question. No comments were
received regarding AVA, and no action was taken by the agency.
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The Department of Defense (DoD) instated its Anthrax
Vaccination Immunization Program (AVIP) in 1997; the program
required that service members be inoculated with AVA. The next
year, Congress prohibited the administration of investigational or
unapproved drugs to service members without informed consent or a
Presidential waiver. Subsequently, President Clinton, in an Executive
Order, required the DoD to obtain informed consent before
administering investigational drugs, and also stated that waivers
would only be granted in cases of absolute necessity.
In October 2001, a petition was filed; it requested that the FDA
declare AVA ineffective for use against inhalation anthrax and
alleged that the prior studies were unsatisfactory. Later, military
personnel and DoD employees successfully obtained an injunction
against the use of AVA without informed consent or a Presidential
waiver. Shortly afterward, the FDA announced a Final Rule which
classified AVA as a Category I drug. In its determination, the FDA
cited the early study as well as a medical report and surveillance data
conducted after the 1985 notice-and-comment period. After the Final
Rule was announced, the court stayed the initial injunction except
with respect to the original plaintiffs. The plaintiffs asked the court to
reinstate the injunction, claiming that the rule was invalid.
ANALYSIS: The court noted that, although the FDA is afforded a
high level of deference for its scientific determinations, it must
comply with the relevant procedures. Although the decision to
classify AVA as a Category I drug is an adjudicative determination
rather than a comprehensive rule, the agency exercised its discretion
to require notice and comment procedures; thus, the FDA must
comply with these procedures as set forth in its own regulations.
The FDA failed to provide the public with a meaningful
opportunity to comment on its decision. The determination to classify
AVA as a Category I drug relied on studies that began long after the
original comment period. Moreover, the Final Rule deviated
significantly from the 1985 Proposed Rule; as it was not a "logical
outgrowth" of that rule, notice-and-comment procedures were
required. AVA was intended to protect against cutaneous anthrax,
and parties would not have been informed of the possibility that the
vaccine might be used to immunize individuals against inhalation
anthrax. This lack of a meaningful opportunity to comment caused
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prejudice, as the agency would have been exposed to opposing
arguments if it had provided such a meaningful opportunity.
Finally, the court extended its permanent injunction beyond the
named plaintiffs. The court noted that district courts have wide
latitude to issue injunctions, and it concluded that it would be
appropriate to issue a government-wide injunction in these
circumstances. Broad relief would protect similarly situated parties
from the application of an invalid programmatic rule.
HOLDING: The government is enjoined from forcing inoculations
until notice-and-comment procedures are complied with.
IMPACT: Until the FDA complies with notice-and-comment
procedures, military personnel and DoD employees may be
compelled to submit to AVA without informed consent or a
Presidential waiver.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, WASHINGTON

Green v. Trans. Sec. Admin., 351 F.Supp.2d 1119 (W.D. Wash.
2005).
LAW: Orders establishing No-Fly and enhanced screening Selectee
lists were outside the district court's jurisdiction, and, because the
constitutional challenges were intertwined with challenges to the
larger program, the court could not consider these challenges. A
government-created stigma or injury to one's reputation is not
enough by itself to create a due process violation.
FACTS: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
responsible for screening passengers and property that are transported
on passenger aircraft. To fulfill its goals, TSA has implemented two
Security Directives which target groups that may pose safety risks.
The "No-Fly List" prohibits individuals on the list from flying, while
the "Selectee List" requires that people on the list go through extra
screening procedures before being allowed to fly. However, the TSA
allows individuals to challenge their placement on the No-Fly List
through an ombudsman process, although the effectiveness and
availability of the process has been disputed.
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Innocent passengers who have been placed on both lists have
challenged the adoption and administration of the lists, claiming that
the TSA's actions have violated their Fourth and Fifth Amendment
rights. These passengers claimed that they suffered harm to their
reputations by being identified for screening, and that they were
subjected to unreasonable searches.
ANALYSIS: Most of the claims were held to extend beyond the
District Court's jurisdiction. First, Congress' special review statute
indicates that the court of appeals would have jurisdiction over final
agency actions. The Security Directives and No-Fly Lists are orders,
providing a statement of the TSA's position and immediately
affecting the parties involved. Moreover, because the broad
constitutional claims are intertwined with the underlying merits of
the Security Directives, the court could not review these claims
without considering TSA policy, which it was unable to do.
However, the Ombudsman Clearance Procedures are not orders,
but voluntary procedures, and the court was therefore able to review
the claim that these procedures did not provide notice or an
opportunity for innocent passengers to clear their names. The court
concluded that the plaintiffs' injury was not substantial enough to
implicate a liberty interest. Although singling out airline passengers
for review may stigmatize them or cause them to become associated
with terrorists, the passengers must be deprived of a tangible interest
as well; injury to reputation alone, without something more, does not
establish a due process violation. Furthermore, as nobody has the
right to travel without any burdens, the burdens on a single mode of
travel do not implicate the plaintiff's right to interstate travel.
HOLDING: The complaint is dismissed.
IMPACT: Airline passengers will not be able to challenge the
TSA's Security Directives in a district court. This decision upholds
the principle that individuals who are stigmatized by government
action will not automatically be able to establish a due process
violation unless they can also demonstrate a separate tangible harm.
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CALIFORNIA STATE COURT
Bldg. Indus. Ass'n of San Diego County v. State Water Res.
Control Bd., 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 128 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
LAW: State and local Water Control Boards acted within their
authority under the Clean Water Act's provision that permit
requirements limit pollution to the "maximum extent practicable"
when they imposed stringent requirements on permittees.
FACTS: The Clean Water Act, prohibits the discharge of pollutants
from "point sources" except in cases where the polluting party
obtains a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
permit. In addition, the terms of NDPES permits depend on the state
water quality standards in a given area; water quality standards are
based on the designated uses of a body of water as well as the
conditions necessary to protect those uses. Congress' 1987
amendments to the Clean Water Act, which address the problem of
storm sewer discharge, permit the fashioning of NPDES controls for
municipal storm water discharge which reduce pollution "to the
maximum extent practicable." The State Water Resources Control
Board (State Water Board) is given the authority to issue NPDES
permits under California's Porter-Cologne Act.
The California Regional Water Control Board, San Diego Region
(Regional Water Board), after conducting a series of public hearings,
issued a municipal storm sewer permit. Based on factual findings, the
Regional Water Board prohibited permittees from discharging
pollutants which have not been reduced to the maximum extent
practicable or discharging pollutants which may contribute to the
exceeding of state and federal water quality standards. Additionally,
municipalities must report their violations and outline a means for
improvement, and they are required to implement "best management
practices" to minimize the effect of pollutants produced by storm
water runoff.
Subsequently, an administrative appeal was filed by the Building
Industry Association of San Diego County (Building Industry); the
State Water Board made some changes to the permit but denied the
Building Industry's appeal. The Building Industry brought its case to
court. After a trial court decided in favor of the Water Boards, the
Building Industry appealed, challenging the trial court's finding that
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the Water Boards did not violate the federal Clean Water Act and
claiming that the Water Boards imposed requirements which
exceeded the "maximum extent practicable" standard allowed by
federal law.
ANALYSIS: In looking at the language and history of the Clean
Water Act, the court concluded that the Water Boards had the
authority to promulgate the storm water permit requirements. The
statute specifically permits government entities to promote
techniques which are deemed "appropriate" for the control of
pollutants, and, therefore, the "maximum extent practicable" was not
intended to limit the Water Boards' ability to adopt permit standards.
Furthermore, given Congress' intent to reduce the harms stemming
from storm water pollution, the Clean Water Act should be
interpreted as giving administrators the tools to combat storm water
pollution rather than limiting their discretion. This interpretation is
also consistent with prior interpretations of the Clean Water Act.
The court also rejected the Building Industry's contention that
compliance with the Water Boards' standards was impossible. The
court found that the Building Industry never met its burden of
showing that the agency's findings were not supported by the facts.
Moreover, the legal argument that a "maximum extent practicable"
standard would require an economically "feasible" solution is
unpersuasive, given the standard's inherent flexibility.
HOLDING: The trial court's decision is affirmed.
IMPACT: Water Boards have the flexibility to fashion effective
controls against municipal storm water pollution without having to
adhere to the explicit text of the statute.

CONNECTICUT STATE COURT

Solomon v. Conn. Med. Examining Bd., 859 A.2d 932 (Conn. App.
Ct. 2004).
LAW: Substantial evidence supported the Medical Board's decision
to revoke a physician's license, and, as the physician's case was
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given appropriate consideration by panel members, his due process
rights were not violated.
FACTS: Connecticut's Medical Examining Board brought charges
against Solomon to revoke his license; the Board took action based
on the fact that New York had suspended his license due to
allegations of negligence, incompetence, and fraud, and the Board
also contended that the alleged negligent actions constituted grounds
for revocation. During six nonconsecutive days in 2001, Solomon's
case was heard by a three member panel, which included one
physician. The panel concluded that Solomon's testimony was not
credible, that the department's expert was more credible than one of
Solomon's experts, and that the testimony of Solomon's other expert
supported the department's allegations. Solomon's license was
revoked.
Solomon appealed, claiming that his right to due process was
violated and that the finding was not supported by substantial
evidence. In support of his due process claim, Solomon claimed that
one of the panel members slept during portions of the hearing, that
panel members were absent during portions of the hearing, and that
only one panel member was a physician. The lower court upheld the
revocation, finding Solomon's allegations to be without merit, and
Solomon appealed.
ANALYSIS: The court agreed with the lower court's conclusions.
The panel composition satisfied statutory requirements, and
supplemented its arguably limited expertise by listening to the expert
testimony of physicians. The court deferred to the lower court's
finding that the panel member who Solomon accused of sleeping was
attentive, asking questions throughout the hearing, concluding that
this conclusion was not clearly erroneous. In addition, the absences
of panel members were excused absences, and every panel member
was familiar with the record in its entirety, in compliance with
applicable statutes. Moreover, the court concluded that any alleged
violation of due process did not materially prejudice Solomon, who
had overwhelming evidence against him; thus, the court would not be
required to set aside the administrative decision even if there was a
due process violation.
Likewise, the court concluded that the panel's findings had
provided a substantial basis from which its legal conclusions could be
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inferred. The record contained a conclusive judicial admission that
Solomon's New York medical license had been suspended, and the
documentary evidence of negligence was adequate grounds to
support the Board's revocation of the license. Additionally, in
deference to the panel's role as trier of fact, the court refused to
analyze its determinations of credibility.
HOLDING: The lower court's holding is upheld, and the Board's
revocation is sustained.
This decision endorses Connecticut's procedural
IMPACT:
requirements, which were complied with by the Medical Board, and
also demonstrates deference to the factual findings of the
administrative panel and lower court.

DELAWARE STATE COURT

Free-Flow Packaging Int'l. v. Sec'v of the Dep't of Natural
Resources and Envtl. Control, 861 A.2d 1233 (Del. 2004).
LAW: After a statute changed the method of calculating permit fees,
the administrative agency charged with assessing fees could calculate
a polluter's permit fees without promulgating a regulation.
Furthermore, the agency's assessment, based on past service reports,
was not arbitrary and capricious, and the agency did not have to
recalculate its statistical data after the statutory modifications were
enacted.
FACTS: The federal Clean Air Act requires sources of air pollution
to obtain operating permits, giving states responsibility over the
permitting process. In 1999, Delaware's General Assembly changed
the fee structures in its permitting plan; whereas fees were originally
determined through emission levels alone, permit fees would be
calculated by using an emissions-based "user fee" and a "base fee,"
which encompassed Department of Natural Resources and
Environmental Control (DNREC) services for a given source of
pollutants. After the new fee structure was adopted, the permit fee for
Free-Flow increased from $7,000 to $20,000, and the company's
classification changed from "small" to "complex" polluter. Free-
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Flow only paid part of the fee, and DNREC issued a Notice of
Violation, which was later upheld by the Environmental Appeals
Board and affirmed by the Superior Court. Free-Flow appealed the
decision to the Delaware Supreme Court, claiming that the
assessment was either procedurally invalid or an arbitrary and
capricious decision.
The court denied that DNREC was engaging in
ANALYSIS:
capricious policy-making. DNREC, following the statute, placed the
company into one of four categories, using service expenses and
emissions in its calculations. Because the DNREC was required to
publish its results in the Delaware Register and Regulations and the
statute provided information about the fee structure, affected parties
could refer to written standards and concerns about arbitrary agency
actions were therefore unfounded. Furthermore, the actions of the
General Assembly in approving the modifications gave DNREC the
authority to change base fee categorizations without implementing a
regulation, particularly given the fact that the permit fees would be
closely monitored and subject to revision.
In addition, the court concluded that DNREC's categorization of
Free-Flow was not arbitrary and capricious. The record supported the
DNREC's initial service estimates, which were used in calculating
the permit fee. Moreover, although DNREC did not repeat its
analysis after the statute was revised, the court concluded that
requiring a reevaluation would be redundant and pointless.
The Superior Court's decision is affirmed, and
HOLDING:
DNREC's assessment is upheld.
IMPACT: Agencies may implement clear statutory directives
outlining methods of classification without being required to create
separate regulations.

FLORIDA STATE COURT

Fla. Democratic Party v. Hood, 884 So.2d 1148 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2004).
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LAW: The risk of uncertainty stemming from non-uniform recount
procedures creates an immediate danger to the public, justifying an
agency's creation of an emergency rule before an upcoming election.
FACTS: The Florida Department of State (Department) was given
responsibility for certifying the state's voting systems, and was
required by statute to adopt rules outlining what would constitute a
clear indication of a voter's choice on a given voting system. The
Department amended a Rule concerning recount procedures as
applied to touchscreen voting systems; it concluded that no recounts
would be conducted for these systems, as the use of touchscreen
voting machines could not result in overvotes and review of
undervotes would not reveal voter intent. The Department's rule was
challenged and invalidated by an Administrative Law Judge (AU);
the AU concluded that the Department did not have the authority to
enact the Rule, as the legislature required the Department to "adopt
specific rules" to determine voter choice in a certified voting system.
Subsequently, the Department issued an Emergency Rule which
counted the machine's results as conclusive and eliminated manual
recounts of overvotes and undervotes. To justify its adoption of the
emergency rule, the Department stated that the absence of an
applicable rule in the wake of the AL's decision could adversely
affect the upcoming elections. The Emergency Rule was considered
necessary to enact uniform standards for conducting manual recounts
of touchscreen systems and ensure confidence in the voting process.
The Florida Democratic Party (FDP) petitioned for review, claiming
that the emergency rule merely reiterated the earlier invalidated rule
and that the Department's reasons did not identify a sudden or
unforeseeable event which would validate emergency rulemaking.
ANALYSIS: In a per curiam opinion, the court denied the FDP's
petition for review. The court noted that, if an agency finds an
immediate danger to public health, safety, or welfare which requires
emergency action, it may institute any rule necessary to combat that
danger. Without considering the merits of the Emergency Rule, the
court concluded that the Department complied with applicable
standards for emergency rulemaking. The court noted that, unless
uniform recount rules were instituted, the electoral process could fall
victim to the same confusion that plagued the state during the 2000
presidential elections. Additionally, the court certified the question of
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HOLDING: The petition for review is denied, and the question of
whether the Department enacted a valid emergency rule is certified to
the Florida Supreme Court.
IMPACT: Agencies may bypass rulemaking procedures to avoid
uncertainty in the voting process immediately before an election.

ILLINOIS STATE COURT

Nader v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 819 N.E.2d 1148 (Ill. App. Ct.
2004).
LAW: An Electoral Board's act of mechanically affixing numbers to
petitions is a "reasonably incidental"
potential candidates'
administrative action and does not violate the Election Code. The
Electoral Board is only empowered to consider whether a petition
complies with Election Code requirements, and cannot issue
subpoenas in order to investigate the manner in which objections
were compiled.
Ralph Nader and his electors (Candidates) filed a
FACTS:
nominating petition with the State Board of Elections (Board). After
the petition sheets were filed, the Board mechanically stamped page
numbers to the bottom of each page. Later, an objector filed a
petition challenging several of the signatures on the petition, claiming
that the signatures were not from registered voters or were not
In addition, the objector referred to several suspect
authentic.
signatures by citing to the Board's page numbers.
The Board, convening as the State Officers Electoral Board
(Electoral Board), began to investigate the objector's allegations.
During the investigation, the Candidates filed a motion to subpoena
the payroll records of State employees who allegedly worked on the
objector's petition at taxpayer expense, in violation of Election Code
provisions. The hearing officer held that the Electoral Board had no
power to investigate these violations, and the Electoral Board did not
issue any subpoenas. After completing its investigations, the
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Electoral Board sustained most of the objections and struck one third
of the signatures on the ballot. After the signatures were stricken, the
Candidates did not have enough signatures to be eligible for the
ballot, and the Electoral Board ordered that Nader's name not appear
on the ballot.
The Candidates petitioned for judicial review, challenging the
Board's interpretation of the Election Code. After the Board's
decision was affirmed, they appealed the matter to the circuit court.
The Appellate Court later accepted the Candidates' request to appeal
on an accelerated docket. In addition, they filed a request in the
Illinois Supreme Court for a supervisory order mandating the reversal
of the Board's decision and the placement of Nader on the ballot;
however, the request was denied.
ANALYSIS: The court rejected the Candidates' contention that the
Board violated the Election Code by mechanically adding page
numbers to the petition. The relevant language, which prohibits filed
petitions from being withdrawn or altered, was found to be a
limitation on potential candidates rather than the Board. Moreover,
numbering the pages was a "reasonably incidental" means of
allowing the Board to perform its task of processing the petition.
Moreover, the court concluded that the Electoral Board could not
issue subpoenas in its investigation. Although the Electoral Board is
given the discretion to issue subpoenas, its inquiry is limited by the
Election Code; it can only investigate whether a petition complies
with Election Code requirements. Thus, the Electoral Board could
not issue subpoenas in order to investigate the manner in which the
objections were compiled.
HOLDING: The circuit court's decision is affirmed.
IMPACT: The scope of the Electoral Board's investigations is
strictly limited, and it cannot investigate incidental matters that do
not directly relate to the sufficiency of a petition, including alleged
statutory violations by interested parties.

420

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges

25-1

INDIANA STATE COURT

Borsuk v. Town of St. John, 820 N.E.2d 118 (Ind. 2005).
LAW: Zoning decisions which deviate from a comprehensive
building plan are not presumptively arbitrary and capricious. A
comprehensive plan is merely a guide, which a town must take into
account when balancing relevant concerns.
FACTS: Chester Borsuk, the owner of a parcel of land that was
partially zoned for residential use, petitioned the St. John Plan
Commission to rezone his entire parcel for commercial use. Although
the town's Comprehensive Plan foresees commercial zoning of the
entire area in the future, and despite the fact that every other lot on
the block is zoned for commercial use, the Plan Commission denied
the petition, and the Town Council denied the request for rezoning.
In its denial, the Plan Commission found that rezoning would not
promote the welfare of the town or conserve property values. Borsuk
filed a petition in court, claiming that the denial was arbitrary and
capricious, and that it was an unconstitutional taking. A trial court
upheld the Town's decision, but the Court of Appeals reversed it and
ordered the Town to rezone Borsuk's parcel.
ANALYSIS: The court described the comprehensive plan as a guide
to community development, rather than a strict set of rules which a
community must follow. Moreover, the Indiana Code only requires
that the legislature "pay reasonable regard to" the comprehensive
plan, permitting other factors to be taken into account. Thus, the
court rejected the Court of Appeals' conclusion that a municipality
must demonstrate a compelling interest before making a zoning
decision which deviates from the comprehensive plan.
In determining whether the zoning decision was arbitrary and
capricious, the court noted that the Plan Commission did consider the
statutory factors in reaching its decision. The Town properly weighed
relevant factors and balanced competing interests, ultimately
endorsing a zoning decision which was a permissible deviation from
the Comprehensive Plan. Concerns which were addressed during
meetings, including traffic congestion, the need for road construction,
and property values, provided a rational basis for this conclusion.
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In addition, the court upheld the trial court's admission of an
affidavit explaining the rationale for the Town's decision; the
affidavit acted as a supplement to the minutes rather than a substitute
for the Town's official records. Finally, the court held that the zoning
regulation would not constitute a taking, as it did not deny Borsuk
economically viable use of the land and served a substantial state
interest.
HOLDING: The trial court's decision is affirmed.
Zoning authorities may choose to depart from
IMPACT:
comprehensive building plans while making individual decisions
without having to demonstrate a compelling reason for these
determinations.

MISSISSIPPI STATE COURT

Titan Tire of Natchez v. Miss. Comm'n on Envtl. Oualitv, 891
S.2d 195 (Miss. 2004).
Courts must defer to agency actions unless they are
LAW:
unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary and capricious, outside
the scope of the agency's authority, or violative of a statutory or
constitutional right.
FACTS: Fidelity Tire Manufacturing Company (Fidelity) sold its
facility to Titan Tire of Natchez (Titan) in 1998, after Fidelity filed
for bankruptcy. Because the tire manufacturing businesses discharged
treated water into a nearby stream, a National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit was required. Fidelity had last
modified its NPDES permit in 1996. The modified permit had been
issued in order to allow Fidelity to install groundwater monitoring
wells, and it had increased the amount of water discharge while
decreasing the permissible contaminant concentration levels.
However, Fidelity never installed the groundwater wells before
selling its property to Titan.
Titan began operations without requesting modifications to the
1996 permit, and even applied for a new permit with the same terms
as the earlier one. In addition, Titan hired several former Fidelity
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employees, including the company's environmental manager. In
2001, the Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ)
issued a complaint, alleging sixteen violations of Titan's NPDES
permit. MDEQ argued that Titan became responsible for adherence
to the permit after the property was purchased, while Titan contended
that the permit should not be enforced against it, as Fidelity never
installed the groundwater wells. After a hearing, the Mississippi
Commission on Environmental Quality (Commission) found that
Titan had violated its permit; the company was fined $5,000. Titan
appealed to the Hinds County Chancery Court, which upheld the
Commission's decision. Subsequently, the issue was appealed to the
Mississippi Supreme Court.
ANALYSIS: The court stressed that judicial review of an agency's
decision is extremely deferential and limited; courts can only
consider whether its action was supported by substantial evidence,
whether it was arbitrary and capricious, whether it was outside the
scope of the agency's authority, or whether it violated a statutory or
constitutional right. The determination was supported by substantial
evidence, as Titan's own discharge monitoring reports indicated that
the company had exceeded allowable discharge limits under the
terms of the permit. Likewise, as the order was supported by
substantial evidence, it was not arbitrary and capricious. Moreover,
the relatively low fine amount indicated that the Commission was not
abusing its discretion.
Furthermore, the court concluded that the Commission was acting
within its power to determine compliance using its chosen
methodology. Although Titan argued that the Commission should
have used mass limits, which are allowed by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), the court disagreed, noting that the EPA
allows for both limits, and that the terms of the permit specified that
concentration limits were to be used. Also, although Titan
complained that it was a victim of "selective enforcement," the court
did not find any violation of the company's equal protection rights, as
the decision to prosecute was not based on impermissible grounds
such as race, religion, or the exercise of constitutional rights.
HOLDING: The Chancery Court's decision is affirmed.
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The longstanding policy of judicial deference to
IMPACT:
administrative agencies is upheld by the court, and aggrieved parties
will be unable to contest an agency decision except under certain
specific circumstances.

NEW JERSEY STATE COURT

Ass'n of Nurse Anesthestists v. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 859 A.2d
1239 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004).
LAW: Regulations requiring that nurse anesthetists be supervised
are not arbitrary and capricious. Furthermore, while the regulations
influence the nursing industry, they do not fall outside the
jurisdiction of the Board of Medical Examiners, as it is allowed to
regulate the practices of physicians administering anesthesia in their
offices. Supervision requirements do not create an illegal guild, as
nurse anesthetists are still able to practice.
FACTS: In 1997, the New Jersey State Board of Medical Examiners
(BME) proposed changing its standards for the administration of
anesthesia in physicians' offices during non-minor surgeries; the new
regulation would require certified registered nurse anesthetists
(CRNAs) to be supervised by an anesthesiologist or a physician who
was not performing the surgery before performing anesthesia. The
New Jersey Association of Nurse Anesthetists (NJANA) challenged
the adoption of the regulation, testifying against the proposal during a
public hearing. The regulation was adopted in 1998, but it decided
not to take a position on an alternative privileging procedure until
more hearings were held. An alternative privileging provision, which
required practitioners without hospital privileges to submit an
application for alternative privileges before offering anesthesia in an
office setting, was adopted in 2001. NJANA challenged the adoption
of these regulations in court.
ANALYSIS: Because an agency is best suited to review its own
regulations, the court deferred to the BME's discretion and authority.
The court noted that the agency had been given the authority to
distinguish between services which nonprofessionals could perform
and those which must be reserved to licensed health care providers.
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Furthermore, the BME's exercise of line-drawing in this case was not
arbitrary and capricious, given the discrepancy in expertise between
CRNAs and anesthesiologists.
The court also rejected empirical data brought forth by NJANA
which suggests that mortality rates for patients receiving anesthesia
from CRNAs and anesthesiologists are similar; the studies relied on
by NJANA do not compare mortality rates in an office setting, and
the BME is empowered to draw the logical conclusion that
anesthesiologists are better suited to administer anesthesia without
waiting for bad results. Additionally, as NJANA presented its
evidence during the hearing process, it was already properly
considered. Furthermore, the court concluded that the conclusion of
the Federation of State Medical Boards (FSMB) that CRNAs may act
without the supervision of an anesthesiologist was not particularly
relevant; the rule merely leaves the decision of whether to "opt out"
of anesthesiologist requirements to state medical boards.
Additionally, the court concluded that the regulation was within
the scope of the BME's authority. Even though the regulation
indirectly impacted the nursing profession, it was directed at
physicians who offer anesthesia in an office setting, and therefore fell
under the BME's authority to regulate the practices of physicians.
Finally, the court rejected the contention that the regulation
establishes a "guild" for anesthesiologists, as CRNAs were still
permitted to perform anesthesia under certain circumstances.
HOLDING: The court affirmed the BME's regulations.
IMPACT: Boards will continue to enjoy wide latitude when
drawing lines to determine which practices may only be undertaken
by licensed professionals.

UTAH STATE COURT

TDM. Inc. v. Tax Comm'n, 103 P.3d 190 (Utah Ct. App 2004).
Parties may seek judicial review before exhausting
LAW:
administrative remedies if exhaustion would serve no useful purpose,
and, when a constitutional claim is a threshold legal issue, exhausting
administrative remedies would be futile.
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FACTS: Utah's new tax on sexually explicit businesses was
challenged by a group of clubs featuring nude or semi-nude dancing
and an escort service; the businesses claimed that the tax was
content-based and therefore violated the First Amendment. The Tax
Commission argued that the complaint was an "as applied" challenge
and that the clubs would have to exhaust their administrative
remedies before proceeding. The trial court dismissed the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction.
ANALYSIS: The court noted that there was an exception to the
exhaustion requirement when the exhaustion of administrative
remedies would serve no useful purpose. The presence of a
constitutional issue does not necessarily obviate the exhaustion
requirement, as administrative hearings may eliminate the need to
determine the constitutional issue and help to frame the factual
issues. However, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
required when the legal questions are threshold issues which would
need to be determined regardless of any developments that may occur
during the administrative proceeding. As the clubs' First Amendment
challenge is a threshold legal issue, and there is no alternative
administrative basis which could resolve the issue, exhaustion would
serve no useful purpose, and the trial court erred when it dismissed
the claim.
HOLDING: The trial court's dismissal is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the trial court.
IMPACT: Agencies may not require individuals to exhaust their
administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of
constitutional claims in cases where the constitutional question is
central to the case and must necessarily be determined.

WISCONSIN STATE COURT

Gehin v. Wis. Group Ins. Bd., 692 N.W.2d 572 (Wis. 2005).
LAW: To constitute substantial evidence, an agency's findings must
be based on more than uncorroborated hearsay evidence.
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FACTS: Luann Gehin sought review of the determination made by
the Group Insurance Board (Board) that her income continuation
insurance benefits be terminated. The Board concluded that Gehin
was no longer incapable of engaging in "substantial gainful activity,"
basing its findings largely on the uncorroborated written hearsay
reports of Drs. Whiffen, Lemon, and Redlin. These reports indicated
that Gehin could work under certain restrictions; she would have to
alternate between sitting and standing, could not lift more than 5
pounds, and must avoid bending and twisting. However, the reports
did not indicate that any jobs which would fulfill these requirements
were available. Gehin's expert, Dr. Shannon, testified during the
hearing, but the Board ultimately disregarded Shannon's testimony,
as he did not examine Gehin during the relevant time period. After
the Court of Appeals upheld the termination, stating that the decision
was supported by substantial evidence, Gehin appealed the matter to
the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
ANALYSIS: Looking at the evidence put forth by the Board, the
court concluded that the Board's decision was not supported by
substantial evidence. Although rules of evidence are relaxed in
administrative matters and the hearsay reports were properly
admitted, this uncorroborated hearsay could not form the sole factual
basis for an administrative decision. The court thereby affirms the
legal residuum rule, which states that an agency cannot rely solely on
uncorroborated hearsay, which does not have sufficient probative
force to constitute substantial evidence.
The court also distinguished the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Perales, which indicated that hearsay evidence may
constitute substantial evidence under the social security statute. The
court indicated that Perales was largely predicated on the need for
efficient procedures in the context of a massive Social Security
program; to the court, these concerns were not relevant in Gehin's
case. Moreover, the court stressed that the reports in Perales were
corroborated by in-person testimony, in contrast to the reports used
against Gehin. In addition, the court did not find the medical reports
to be reliable, as they failed to address the ultimate question of
whether Gehin fit the Board's contract definition of "totally
disabled."
The court rejected the Board's other arguments in opposition to
the application of the legal residuum rule. Even though Gehin could
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theoretically have subpoenaed the authors of the reports, this option
is often unrealistic, and the court was unwilling to place the burden
of requesting a subpoena on a claimant. Furthermore, the hearsay
evidence would not be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule.
The medical records were compiled in anticipation of litigation,
rather than as documents made in the course of business or records
created by a health care provider. Additionally, the Board did not
comply with the admissibility requirements for business or medical
records; no qualified witness provided testimony to establish the
medical records, and the Board did not give notice to Gehin. Finally,
the court concluded that, even if the reports were admissible under an
exception to the hearsay rule, they would still be hearsay, and,
therefore, would only have limited probative value.
Although the hearsay reports corroborate each other, the court
found this insufficient. For the court, hearsay evidence must be
corroborated by non-hearsay evidence in order to prevent
"bootstrapping" of uncorroborated evidence and preserve the fairness
of the proceeding. However, the court indicates that this requirement
would not apply in all circumstances, particularly if the evidence is
presented by a claimant rather than an agency. Moreover, parties may
stipulate to certain facts or agree that the agency may base its
findings on uncorroborated hearsay, circumventing the requirement
that agencies corroborate their hearsay documents.
Finally, the court rejected the argument that Gehin waived her
right to challenge the Board's exclusive reliance on the documents
because she failed to object to their admission. At the time of
admission, such an objection would have been futile, and a claimant
should therefore not be required to object.
HOLDING: The appellate court's decision is reversed.
IMPACT: The holding preserves the use of the residuum rule in
Wisconsin, severely limiting the scope of the Supreme Court's
decision in Perales. The findings of administrative agencies will be
held to a more stringent standard, as decisions cannot be based solely
on uncorroborated hearsay such as medical reports.

